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Abstract 
The new trade theory, which emerged in the early 1980s, emphasised 
economies of scale and market failures as driving forces behind 
international trade. As opposed to the earlier theory, which mainly 
assumed perfect competition, the new trade theory provided a rationale 
for industrial policy. This article shows how industrial policy targeting 
specific firms or industries may be socially desirable within the new 
trade theory framework. Models from new economic geography and the 
more recent ‘new’ new trade theory with heterogeneous firms are also 
discussed. The main focus is put on models with pecuniary 
externalities. 
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 Introduction 
In 1987 Paul Krugman, who was later to win the Noble memorial prize 
in economics, published a famous article titled ‘Is free trade passé?’ His 
question was based on the emergence of the new trade theory in the 
early 1980s. In this article I discuss how this new theory provided a 
rationale for industrial policy. Industrial policy is normally thought of 
as policy aimed at influencing a country’s industrial structure so as to 
create the highest possible national income. However, here I employ a 
more narrow definition, seeing industrial policy as policy that targets 
certain firms or industries. There are many different types of policy 
instruments, including various kinds of subsidies, taxes and public 
ownership, as well as other types of regulations that affect the 
industrial sector, such as legislation on concessions, competition and 
public procurement. My focus here is on subsidies and taxes, including 
trade policy measures such as export promotion and import tariffs. An 
example of this type of industrial policy in Norway is the exemption 
from the electricity tax for energy-intensive industry. Such policy is not 
unproblematic, as it may conflict with EEA and WTO regulations.  
Before 1980, mainstream international trade theory had focused on 
trade in different products between different countries, and 
comparative advantage was held to be the main driving force behind 
trade. Any deviations from perfect competition were believed to not to 
have any major impact on the conclusions offered by the models. 
Under perfect competition, the market ensures that resources are 
allocated in the most efficient way. That means it is not possible to 
increase national income by supporting specific firms or industries. 
Therefore, industrial policy can, at best, benefit certain actors; for 
society as a whole it will lead to net losses. From an efficiency point of 
view, industrial policy would make sense only if there were deviations 
from perfect competition, so that it could correct for market failures.1 
Traditional trade theory therefore provided a poor rationale for 
                                                          
1  Increasing national income is not necessarily the only goal of economic policy. 
Other goals may be reduced unemployment, or more equal income distribution. 
Yet, basic economic theory holds that in order to achieve a goal one should use the 
most targeted policy instrument – which will normally not be industrial policy in the 
above-mentioned cases. Yet, St. meld. [Norwegian White Paper] (2011–2012) 
states: ‘Den overordnede målsettingen for næringspolitikken er å legge til rette for 
størst mulig samlet verdiskaping i norsk økonomi og arbeid for alle – that is, not 
only highest possible national income, but also employment for everyone are 
stated as goals for Norwegian industrial policy.  
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industrial policy: instead, free trade and no government intervention 
would ensure the best allocation of resources.2  
This changed with the emergence of the new trade theory, where 
Paul Krugman himself was a major contributor. Emphasising the 
importance of economies of scale and market failures such as imperfect 
competition and externalities as driving forces behind trade, the theory 
provided a rationale for industrial policy. There are two strands within 
the new trade theory. The first one emphasises imperfect competition 
and strategic interaction, and there are economies of scale at the level 
of the individual firm. The second places the emphasis on positive 
externalities, and there are often economies of scale at industry level. 
Externalities may be pure, stemming, for example, from technological 
factors such as knowledge spillovers; or they can be pecuniary, 
stemming from market access effects. The idea in both strands is that 
some firms or industries create exceptionally high gains for society – 
gains that are not always reflected in private returns. Industrial policy 
can therefore work to increase national income by helping domestic 
firms to gain market power abroad (causing profit shifting), or by 
encouraging the establishment of industries with positive externalities.  
In this article I show how models from both strands have provided a 
rationale for industrial policy, but the main focus will be on models 
with pecuniary externalities. These types of models are frequently 
used. They form the basis for a large part of the literature on new 
economic geography, and also for the ‘new’ new trade theory with 
heterogeneous firms; and they work as baseline models for analysing a 
wide range of issues such as economic growth, foreign direct 
investments (FDI), environmental legislation, minimum wage, worker 
migration etc.3  
Even though the new trade theory provides a rationale for industrial 
policy, the objective of the theory was not primarily to advocate 
interventionism, but rather to explain how trade in similar products 
between similar countries can arise. Krugman himself notes several 
problems in conducting industrial policies in practice. Therefore, in his 
1987 article he concludes that free trade is still a ‘reasonable rule of 
thumb’, but that it ‘can never again be asserted as the policy that 
economic theory tells us is always right’ (Krugman, 1987a, p. 132). 
Section 2 discusses models with strategic interaction, while section 
3 discusses models with externalities. In section 4, I turn to the 
                                                          
2  An exception is the argument of optimal tariffs, which holds that a country may 
benefit from imposing a tariff, provided it is large enough to affect the world market 
price. 
3  For older surveys on industrial policy in the light of new trade theory see e.g. Klette 
(1992) and Shams (1997). De Carlo (2007) provides a more recent survey. 
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problems involved in conducting industrial policy, and offer some 
conclusions.  
 Models with strategic interaction 
Models with strategic interaction focus on economies of scale at the 
level of the individual firm and oligopolistic competition between a 
limited number of firms. Firms have market power and can earn pure 
profits in international markets. A good example of an international 
industry with characteristics like this is the industry for videogame 
consoles. This is a highly internationalised industry consisting of three 
main actors – Microsoft, Sony and Nintendo. Other examples could be 
the industries for credit cards, web browsers, or tablets. 
Firms can affect the world market prices of their own outputs or 
those of other firms. Typically, a firm will take into account how its own 
choices affect the choices of other firms – in other words, there is 
strategic interaction. Firms’ strategic choice variables may be prices, 
output, R&D investments, etc. By influencing these strategic choices, 
industrial policy can increase a domestic firm’s market power at the 
expense of a foreign firm, and thereby increase national income. 
A simple and well-known example of a model from this strand of 
literature is given by Brander and Spencer (1985), who describe how 
export subsidies can affect a firm’s strategic choice about output. This 
is often used to illustrate competition between the two leading aircraft 
manufacturers, Airbus and Boeing. There is one domestic firm and one 
foreign firm competing in a third foreign market. Each firm first decides 
how much output to produce (i.e. the strategic choice variable is 
output). Thereafter, the market price adjusts to total output. Higher 
aggregated output will lead to a lower market price, which again may 
lead to loss of profits. Therefore, firms find it profitable to restrict their 
production. 
Figure 1 illustrates each firm’s reaction function (Ri, i=h,f). The 
reaction function for the domestic firm (Rh) describes how its choice of 
output is influenced by the foreign firm’s choice of output. As shown in 
the figure, if the foreign firm decides to increase its output (xf), the 
domestic firm will find it profitable to decrease its own output (xh). 
However, the decrease in xh will be smaller than the increase in xf. For 
simplicity, we assume that firms are symmetric. Rf describes the same 
points, but from the foreign firm’s point of view. The equilibrium in the 
model is given by point A, where the two reaction functions cross. Now, 
what happens if the domestic government imposes an export subsidy? 
In this case, for each level of output from the foreign firm, the domestic 
firm will find it profitable to produce more. Rh therefore shifts out, 
while Rf  remains unchanged. The new equilibrium is given by point B. 
We see that the optimal choice for the domestic firm is to produce 
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more, whereas the optimal response of the foreign firm is to produce 
less. Therefore, the domestic firm grabs a higher share of the market 
and increases its profit. It can be shown that these extra profits are 
higher than the cost of the subsidy; consequently, the subsidy will lead 
to a net increase in the home country’s income. 
Figure 1 
 
 
This model is very appealing, providing many insights in a simple way 
– but, unfortunately, any conclusions regarding the best policy 
instrument are highly dependent upon assumptions. Eaton and 
Grossman (1986) showed that if the strategic choice variable is price 
instead of output, we may reach the opposite conclusion: an export tax 
will be welfare improving.4 There are also many other factors that can 
affect the conclusion regarding the best policy instrument. If there are 
many domestic firms and only a few foreign firms, an export tax may be 
better. If there are many oligopolistic industries with different profit-
shifting opportunities, it may be it may be profitable to subsidise some 
of them and tax others. There are also various possible strategic choice 
variables, and a range of possible policy instruments. These and many 
other points are discussed in the survey article by Brander (1995). To 
conclude on this point, I believe that it is fair to say that this strand of 
literatures offers no simple and robust recommendations regarding 
industrial policy. 
 
                                                          
4  The reason is that price competition tends to lead both firms to set the price too low 
and produce too much output as compared to what is optimal for each firm. An 
export tax forces the domestic firm to charge a higher price and hence restrict its 
output. 
 
 Models with positive externalities 
Models with positive externalities explain how international trade can 
lead to concentration of industrial activity within countries because 
firms are internationally mobile.5 Examples of industry concentration 
could be the watch industry in Switzerland or the shipping and 
offshore industries in Norway. There is some empirical evidence to 
indicate that industrial concentration has increased in recent decades 
(see e.g. Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman, 2002).  
A positive externality is a positive side effect of economic activity. 
An example is spillovers: knowledge in one firm, for example acquired 
through on-the-job training, can spill over to another firm, for example 
when employees shift jobs. The larger the number of firms within an 
industry, the higher will be the economic gains for society. Industrial 
policy that encourages the domestic establishment of firms can 
therefore increase national income. 
There are various types of positive externalities. Some externalities 
are pure, and due to technological factors. Knowledge spillovers fall 
within this category, and are held to have been important, for example, 
for the concentration of the IT industry in Silicon Valley (see e.g. 
Krugman, 1991). Other types of externalities, known as pecuniary 
externalities, are due to market access effects. An example here is an 
input variety externality, where having a greater variety of intermediate 
inputs available results in more efficient production. This type of 
externality is commonly modelled in the new trade theory and new 
economic geography traditions. Empirical evidence indicates that it is 
important in several Norwegian maritime transport industries, where 
access to a greater variety of service suppliers yields higher efficiency 
(Knarvik and Steen, 2002). The above-mentioned examples are 
examples of externalities that create economies of scale at industry 
level. However, much of the literature builds on a class of models 
where positive externalities increase consumer satisfaction rather than 
the productivity of firms. In the following section I discuss some 
important mechanisms in this class of models by taking a closer look at 
the seminal model presented in Helpman and Krugman (1985), chapter 
10.4 (from now on referred to as HK, 1985). This is an important 
workhorse model, and has been used as the point of departure for 
many other models within the traditions of new trade theory, new 
economic geography, and ‘new’ new trade theory with heterogeneous 
firms. 
                                                          
5  See Ulltveit-Moe (2008) for a good overview. 
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New trade theory and the product variety externality 
The model describes a world where there are two countries, home and 
foreign; and two sectors of production, traditional and manufacturing. 
Consumers spend a constant share of their income on goods from each 
sector. The traditional sector produces a homogeneous good under 
constant returns to scale. This sector should not be interpreted too 
literally. It mainly serves as a modelling trick in order to ensure wage 
equalisation between the two countries, and it allows us to focus on 
firm relocation and concentration effects in a simple way.6 It is the 
manufacturing sector that is of interest. It consists of one industry 
which is characterised by many homogeneous firms. Each firm 
produces a unique variety of the industry’s good under increasing 
returns to scale. A popular textbook example of an industry like this is 
the car industry: there are many different cars, but each car basically 
does the same thing: they are all varieties of the same good. Other 
examples are the industries for soft drinks, athletic shoes, or breakfast 
cereals.  
Each firm has monopoly power in its own good, but faces 
competition from other firms producing other varieties of the good. A 
firm does not take into consideration how its own choices affect other 
firms’ choices; and, as opposed to the model described in section 2, 
there is no strategic interaction between firms. This type of competition 
is called monopolistic competition. For simplicity, all firms are 
assumed to be symmetric, thus the producer prices of all varieties are 
equal. Demand for manufacturing goods is characterised by consumers 
valuing variety (so-called ‘love of variety’); they all want to consume 
some of each variety of the industrial good. We assume that 
manufacturing firms can move without cost from one country to 
another, but that trade in manufacturing goods is costly. 
How will the patterns of trade be in this model? The first main point 
of the model is that it creates intra-industry trade. Countries will sell 
manufacturing goods to each other, because consumers value variety 
and want both foreign and domestic varieties of the industrial good. 
For example, let us say the two countries are Germany and South 
Korea, and the manufacturing sector consists of one industry: cars. 
German consumers buy German cars. They also want to buy some 
South Korean cars because each car is perceived somewhat differently 
from another, and consumption of a greater variety of car types is 
considered a benefit that increases consumer utility.7 The same is true 
                                                          
6  Nevertheless, as pointed out by Davis (1998), the assumptions made about this 
sector are not unimportant, and may influence the results of the model 
considerably. 
7  Strictly speaking the model assumes a representative consumer who wants some 
of each variety, which makes more sense with soft drinks than with cars. However, 
the model makes sense also for the car example if we interpret the representative 
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for South Korean consumers. Germany and South Korea will therefore 
sell cars to each other.8 However, since cars are costly to trade, 
domestic consumers will buy more domestic car types than foreign 
ones.  
The second main point of the model is that differences between 
countries may lead to a greater concentration of manufacturing firms in 
one of the countries. We will look at differences in country size, as in 
the original model by HK, 1985. However, other authors have showed 
that other type of differences may lead to similar results (see Huang 
and Huang, 2011 for differences in technology, or a slightly different 
model in Martin and Rogers, 1995 for differences in infrastructure). 
To illustrate the point, we first assume that the world’s 
manufacturing production is distributed according to country size. 
Figure 2 shows the two countries and the pattern of trade. The size of 
the circles indicates the size of demand in each country. The grey 
shaded area is the size of the manufacturing sector, and the white area 
is the size of the traditional sector. Now let us return to the example of 
the car industry in Germany and in South Korea. If Germany is twice 
the size of South Korea and the German car industry is twice the size of 
the South Korean car industry, each South Korean car producer will 
export twice as much as each German car producer, because demand 
for cars is twice as high in Germany as in South Korea. Trade in cars 
will be balanced, and there will be no trade in the traditional good. 
Figure 2 
 
 
                                                                                                                                        
consumer as an aggregate of all consumers, where some prefer one type of car 
while others prefer another. 
8  The ability to explain intraindustry trade like this represented a major step forward 
in international trade theory. The earlier theory of comparative advantage focused 
on trade in different products between different countries, such as USA selling 
machinery to Bangladesh and Bangladesh selling clothes to the USA. Among the 
first models to deal with intraindustry trade was the one presented in Krugman 
(1980), which is similar but somewhat different from the one described here. 
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Now, by moving from South Korea to Germany, a car producer will pay 
trade costs on a lower share of its sales, because it can now sell more in 
its home market. Profitability in the car industry is therefore higher in 
the large country, and firms will move from the small to the large 
country until there is no additional benefit. In equilibrium, the large 
country gets a more than proportional share of the total number of 
firms in the manufacturing sector. This is the ‘home market’ effect, 
shown in figure 3. The size of the car industry in Germany becomes 
more than twice the size of the car industry in South Korea, and, 
although there is still intra-industry trade in cars, Germany has become 
a net car exporter. South Korea exports the traditional good in addition 
to cars, in order to keep total trade balanced. The figure also illustrates 
what will happen if trade costs decline. Then the benefits of a 
manufacturing firm moving to the large country will be even higher, 
because it becomes less costly to serve small-country consumers from 
abroad. The home market effect is therefore magnified, and for 
sufficiently low trade costs the small country may become de-
industrialised. The home market effect does not only appear in HK, 
1985, but in many other models with other competition forms or 
demand structures (Felbermayr and Jung, 2012 provides an overview). 
Figure 3 
 
 
From this example, we see that manufacturing production will become 
concentrated in the large country. As mentioned above, other type of 
country differences would create similar effects. Industrial policy that 
creates favourable conditions for manufacturing production can 
therefore lead to concentration of the manufacturing sector. 
But should countries strive to attract more manufacturing 
production? The answer is yes, and the reason is the product variety 
externality. Consumers buy some of all manufacturing goods, home-
produced as well as imported. But imports have higher prices due to 
trade costs. The general price level could therefore potentially be 
reduced by getting firms to move from abroad to the home country. 
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Equation 1 shows the expression for real income in home country Yh. 
Real income is equal to nominal income, yh, divided by the general 
price level, as given by the ideal price index for manufactured goods, 
Ph, in the power of µ. Ph is determined by the price of each variety of the 
industrial good, q, the number of firms in each country ni, and an 
expression reflecting the level of trade costs t (increasing t indicates 
lower trade costs).9  
Equation 1 
(1) 
 
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From equation 1 we see that a reduction in the number of foreign firms 
(nf) and a corresponding increase in the number of domestic firms (nh) 
will increase real income, because the price index falls. The intuition is 
that home country consumers get access to more varieties at a lower 
price (because they have to pay trade costs on a lower number of the 
varieties they buy). 
Industrial policy implications 
To analyse implications for industrial policy in the HK 1985 model, we 
will first look at what happens if there is a mutual reduction in trade 
costs of manufacturing goods. This has two effects. The first effect is 
that the price of imported goods decreases. t increases in equation 1, 
and this results in a lower price index and hence a higher real income. 
Consequently, the effect tends to increase real income in both 
countries. The second effect is a magnification in the home market 
effect as described above: firms relocate to the large country (or, 
alternatively, the country with more favourable conditions for 
manufacturing production). This tends to increase the price index and 
hence decrease real income in the small country. Thus for the small 
country the two effects pull in opposite directions. It can be shown, 
however, that for the small country the first effect is greater than the 
second. In consequence, both countries gain from trade liberalisation 
in terms of real income, although we should note that the small country 
loses in terms of manufacturing production. 
Whereas the example above concerned mutual policy, we are often 
interested in unilateral policy. Venables (1987) analyses taxes and 
                                                          
9  µ and a are parameters in the utility function. They are both positive. µ is the 
expenditure share for manufacturing goods, and it is lower than 1. a=1/(σ-1) where 
σ>1 is the elasticity of substitution between each variety of the industrial good. 
t=τ1-σ, where τ>1 is trade costs of the iceberg type. τ denotes how much of the good 
that has to be shipped in order for 1 unit to arrive at the destination. 
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subsidies. If a country imposes a unilateral tax on imports (i.e. a tariff), 
it is usual to believe that the price level will increase, due to more 
expensive imports. However, that does not happen here. When 
exporting to the home country becomes more expensive, some firms 
will find it profitable to relocate from foreign to home. Thus, nh 
increases and nf decreases. The share of imports in manufacturing 
consumption declines in the home country, and real income increases 
via reductions in the price index. We should note that real income 
increase even if we do not consider tariff revenues. Consequently, a 
country can attract manufacturing firms and increase its real income by 
imposing an import tax. As Baldwin et al. (2003) note, this modelling 
framework therefore provides a rationale for the general system of 
preferences (GSP) within the WTO, where developing countries are 
allowed to keep higher tariffs towards developed countries than vice 
versa. The system will let developing countries attract manufacturing 
production. 
Subsidies on export, production or R&D have similar effects as an 
import tax. They all increase the profitability of manufacturing 
production in the home country, which leads to firm relocation from 
foreign to home. This again leads to a reduction in the price index and 
an increase in real income. Venables (1987) shows that the increase in 
real income is larger than the expense of the subsidy: thus, also 
industrial policy that works through subsidies is socially desirable.  
New economic geography and the input variety externality 
In the modelling framework described above, the benefit of getting a 
large manufacturing sector comes from one channel only – the product 
variety externality that increases consumer satisfaction. However there 
are many other potential benefits in having manufacturing production 
that are not part of the model. The benefit may therefore be 
undervalued. A manufacturing sector of a certain size may be 
important for a country’s ability to absorb new technology. There may 
also be technological externalities and dynamic benefits related to R&D 
or learning by doing. Elements like these are discussed in the ‘new 
growth’ literature. Furthermore, there can be input variety 
externalities, something which is frequently discussed in the new 
economic geography literature.  
Krugman and Venables (1995) is a well-known example of the 
latter. The model is an extension of HK, 1985 where it is assumed that 
manufactured goods are no longer used solely for consumption. They 
can also be used as intermediate inputs in the production of 
manufactured goods. As a consequence, there will be a factor price 
index for intermediate inputs that is equal to the price index for 
manufactured consumption goods, P, in equation 1. More 
manufacturing firms in one country now yields two advantages. Firstly, 
it gives higher consumer satisfaction because a larger share of domestic 
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consumption is based on domestically produced goods with no 
transport costs. This is the same effect as before. It also gives greater 
profitability in production, because a larger share of domestic firms’ 
use of intermediate inputs is based on home-produced inputs with no 
transport costs. This is the new effect, and it creates economies of scale 
at industry level. These two effects make full concentration of 
manufacturing production possible in one country, even if the two 
countries are initially (almost) equal. 
Figure 4 illustrates this. We now assume countries of equal size in 
order to highlight the new mechanism. Initially, manufacturing 
production is divided equally between the two countries. If, for some 
reason, a manufacturing firm moves from one country to another, 
profitability in manufacturing production will increase in the country 
with more manufacturing firms, through a lower price index on 
intermediate inputs. This could make it profitable for yet another firm 
to relocate to that country, which in turn would increase profitability in 
manufacturing production even more. The process becomes self-
reinforcing, and leads to full concentration of manufacturing 
production in a core country. This core country will export 
manufacturing goods to consumers in the other, peripheral country, 
and the peripheral country will export the traditional good to the core.  
However, this core–periphery pattern does not always result. Trade 
costs must be sufficiently low. If trade costs are high, it is very 
expensive to supply manufactured goods to the consumers in the 
periphery from the core, and firms will prefer to stay in their local 
markets. 
Figure 4 
 
 
From our previous discussion it is now evident that industrial policy 
aimed at attracting manufacturing firms can be even more 
advantageous than before. A country can now get full concentration of 
the manufacturing sector, even if that country is initially not too 
different from the other country. Reductions in trade costs make this 
more likely to happen. In addition, small and temporary differences 
between countries may lead to large, lasting changes. 
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‘New’ new trade theory with firm heterogeneity 
A limitation of the new trade theory is that it is less suitable for 
analysing policy that serves to reduce entry barriers in foreign markets. 
When firms want to start exporting they must spend resources on 
gathering information and finding customers in the export market. 
There may also be non-tariff barriers between countries, like 
differences in product standards or other types of regulations. Such 
barriers may require firms to undertake costly product adjustments in 
order to be able to export, which will often involve paying a fixed cost 
before starting to export.  
Fixed export costs may be important. Direct export subsidies, which 
affect variable trade costs, are less relevant today because the WTO and 
EEA agreements emplace heavy restrictions on such measures. They 
are also likely to be subject to countermeasures. Therefore, today’s 
export promotion policy is more concerned with helping firms to 
overcome entry barriers by supporting institutions that can provide 
market information, customer networks, or export credits. This type of 
policy aims more at reducing the fixed export costs of firms, and not 
their variable trade costs. Furthermore, WTO (2012) has shown that 
non-tariff barriers have become increasingly prevalent in the past 
decade. Reducing them is often an important element in today’s 
preferential trade agreements (WTO, 2011).10  
All the same, fixed export costs were not part of the original new 
trade theory literature, which considered only the variable costs of 
trade. This changed with the introduction of the ‘new’ new trade theory 
with heterogeneous firms. Although earlier contributions exist, the 
seminal article by Mark Melitz from 2003 is generally considered to 
have initiated this strand of literature. While the focus in the new trade 
theory had been on sectors, the ‘new’ new trade theory places more 
focus on firms. Melitz makes two important adjustments to the earlier 
literature. Firstly, he introduces fixed export costs into the model, 
which allows us to analyse the topics described above. Secondly, he 
abstracts from the assumption of homogeneous firms. Firms’ marginal 
productivities differ and are described by a continuous distribution. 
Within models of this type we get a firm selection effect. Only the most 
productive ones will earn enough in the foreign market to cover the 
fixed export costs. Therefore, only some firms will find it profitable to 
export, and exporters will be larger and more productive than non-
exporters. These predictions are clearly in accordance with empirical 
evidence (Bernard et al. 2011), but contradict the models of new trade 
theory, which predict that either all or no firms will export. Mutual 
trade liberalisation will induce more firms to start exporting, and a few 
                                                          
10  For example, it is an important part of the ongoing negotiations of a trade and 
investment partnership (TTIP) between the EU and the USA. 
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large, highly productive exporters will replace many small, less 
productive non-exporters. 
Analysis of industrial policy within this framework is still in its 
infancy, but a few recent contributions have touched upon the issue. 
For example, Baldwin and Forslid (2010) discuss welfare effects from 
mutual trade liberalisation and explicitly analyse the difference 
between reducing fixed and variable trade costs.  
Reductions in variable costs can have an anti-variety effect. The 
number of home-produced goods decreases because a few large and 
highly productive exporters replace many small and less productive 
non-exporters. This loss of domestically-produced varieties is offset by 
an increase in the number of imported varieties. Still, the number of 
varieties consumed may decrease in small countries.  
Mutual reductions in fixed export costs, on the other hand, have a 
more ambiguous effect. Such reductions may come as a consequence of 
preferential trade agreements that reduce non-tariff barriers, or when 
countries adapt to international standards. Exporters no longer have to 
sell such large quantities in the foreign market in order to cover their 
fixed export costs. The new exporters that replace the smallest and less 
productive non-exporters are not as large as in the case of variable 
trade cost reductions. The reduction in the number of home-produced 
varieties is hence dampened, so mutual reductions in fixed export costs 
do not necessarily induce the same anti-variety effect as mutual 
reduction in variable trade costs.  
Baldwin and Forslid (2010) show that, despite the anti-variety 
effect, both types of trade liberalisation will be welfare improving 
regardless of country size, just as in HK (1985). Nevertheless, if home-
produced goods have a special value, or product variety is particularly 
important, trade liberalisation through reductions in fixed trade costs 
would be more desirable than trade liberalisation through reductions in 
variable trade costs.  
Unilateral policy is analysed in Pflüger and Russek (2014). With 
heterogeneous firms, policy effects on real income work not only 
through changes in prices and firm relocation as in HK (1985), but also 
through the firm selection effect. Unilateral policy that improves access 
to the foreign market, be it through reductions in fixed or variable trade 
costs, increases average firm size and productivity in the home market, 
thereby creating a competitive advantage. Pflüger and Russek show 
that such policy leads to increased real income in the home country – 
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just as in the homogeneous firms framework analysed by Venables 
(1987).11   
Is industrial policy always advantageous?  
The models sketched above have shown that industrial policy can be 
socially desirable in the presence of externalities. By attracting 
manufacturing production, it can lead to an increase in a country’s real 
income. Does this mean that the strand of new trade theory dealing 
with externalities provides simple and robust recommendations with 
regard to industrial policy? Unfortunately not. The models build on 
some highly simplifying assumptions. They often posit no 
technological differences between countries, that there are trade costs 
only on manufactured goods, and that firm relocation entails no costs. 
These simplifications make it possible to isolate welfare effects 
originating from company relocation.  
However, as pointed out in Baldwin et al. (2003, ch. 10.2), the 
benefit of industrial policy hinges on firm relocation being sufficiently 
large. Conclusions can therefore be highly sensitive to the assumptions 
of the model. If firm relocation is costly, that may change the 
conclusions. This point can be studied in the canonical model of 
Krugman (1980), where firm relocation is impossible. The model is 
similar to the HK, 1985 model and deals with homogeneous firms. 
However, in that model there is no traditional sector and the number of 
firms in a country is therefore determined solely by its size. Demidova 
and Rodriguez-Clare (2011) show that a unilateral import tariff in this 
model will reduce real income in the country that imposes the tariff.12  
A final point is that in the simple framework of HK (1985), the 
worldwide number of firms, firm output, and factor prices remain 
unaffected by trade costs. However, Flam and Helpman (1987) show 
                                                          
11  Unilateral reduction in fixed export costs might come from export promotion 
policies. It should be noted, however, that the authors do not consider the cost of 
the policy. Thus it would not be correct to interpret the policy instruments in their 
model as subsidies, which also has a cost that must be taken into consideration. 
This can make it somewhat unclear as to what type of policy they are actually 
analysing. 
12  Note however, that they do not consider the tariff revenue. Gros (1987) showed that 
there is in fact an optimal tariff in these type models if tariff revenue is taken into 
consideration. The reason is that ‘… each producer has some monopoly power, and 
it is in the interest of the home country that producers exercise this monopoly 
power abroad but not at home’ (p. 357). This is very similar to the argument about 
optimal tariffs from the traditional trade literature. Felbermayr, Jung and Larch 
(2013) conduct a similar analysis within the heterogeneous firms framework. They 
show that the optimal tariff will be larger if firm level productivity is more 
dispersed. 
New trade theory: implications for industrial policy 19 
that effects from subsidies can be ambiguous when trade costs can 
affect factor prices and output per firm. 
 
 Discussion 
We have seen that the new trade theory can provide a rationale for 
industrial policy targeting certain strategically important firms or 
industries. However, we have also noted several problems with this 
type of policy. Conclusions regarding benefit from the policy are often 
sensitive to modelling assumptions, so the theory provides no clear and 
robust policy recommendations. Moreover, industrial policy in one 
country may induce other countries to implement countermeasures, 
which may lead to losses for everyone.  
Another point is that these theories do not always consider the full 
cost of the policy. Subsidies are often assumed to be financed through 
lump-sum taxes, but in real life we know that tax collection leads to 
efficiency losses. In addition, promoting export in some industries may 
lead to increased factor prices which can harm other industries. There 
may be distributional concerns as well: for example, the social planner 
may put more emphasis on consumers than firms. All these cases may 
alter the conclusions regarding the social desirability of industrial 
policy.  
Even in the case where policy recommendations are fairly clear, 
many authors have pointed out the huge information problems related 
to conducting industrial policy that targets specific firms or industries. 
In section 2 we saw that the government must have knowledge about 
the competition form and the strategic choice variables of firms. If there 
are externalities, the government should also have knowledge about 
the characteristics of the externalities.  
Firstly, the government should have information about the 
mechanism that creates the externality, because the best industrial 
policy should target this mechanism directly. For example, in the case 
of knowledge spillovers the best policy would be to support R&D or 
training, not production of final goods, whereas in the case of 
externalities stemming from intermediate input variety effects, the best 
policy would be to support production of intermediate goods.  
Secondly, as pointed out by Krugman (1987b) and many others, the 
government should know whether or not externalities are limited by 
national borders. If they are not, industrial concentration is not likely 
to occur and then it will not matter where the industry is located. For 
example, if R&D in the cell-phone industry spills over to firms in other 
countries through reverse engineering there is a global externality. In 
this case there is no reason to support/protect domestic establishment 
of firms. In fact, protecting the domestic market through import tariffs 
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may actually prevent the inflow of knowledge from abroad. By contrast, 
knowledge spillovers from workers shifting jobs are an externality more 
likely to be limited by a geographical area, and supporting/protecting a 
local industry may be wise.  
Thirdly, as discussed in e.g. Forslid and Midelfart (2005), the 
government should know who will get the externality gains. For 
example, an intermediate input externality that reduces firms’ 
production costs may result in lower consumer prices and/or higher 
profits. If consumer prices decline but most of the goods are exported, 
the gains will accrue mainly to foreigners. In the case of higher firm 
profits, foreigners will also be the ones that benefit if firms are owned 
mainly by foreign shareholders. In both cases there would be little 
reason to support/protect the domestic industry. 
Both when there is strategic interaction and when there are positive 
externalities, the government should have information about the size of 
the policy instrument required and the size of the potential gains. 
Subsidies/taxes that are too low will not cause rent shifting or firm 
relocation, whereas subsidies/taxes that are too high would lead to 
more production than desirable. Both cases can lead to losses rather 
than gains. Also, if expected gains are small, the policy may simply not 
be worth the effort. 
These information problems are likely to create lobbying and rent-
seeking. Firms and industries will try to convince the government that 
they are strategically important and need support, and the government 
may be choosing the wrong firms or industries. This has led many 
authors to conclude that sector-neutral policy is preferable. Such policy 
aims at creating good conditions for the industrial sector as a whole. It 
can be policy that ensures macroeconomic stability, improves 
infrastructure, ensures flexible labour markets, ensures competition, 
encourages innovation, etc. The argument is that this type of policy will 
ensure that the best firms succeed. An example of sector-neutral 
industrial policy that serves to encourage innovation in Norway is the 
tax deduction scheme for costs directly related to R&D, Skattefunn. 
However, as pointed out by Reve (1996), this type of policy may 
not be sufficiently targeted, and potentially large gains that could 
follow from the correct sector-specific industrial policy will not be 
realised. Thus, governments should be careful with sector-specific 
policy. It should be considered only when there are large and 
identifiable profit shifting opportunities or positive externalities. Such 
policies should be founded on research-based knowledge, not 
suggestions from the industrial sector. 
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